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Looking back at the past 75 years of international law, I
w ould say w e have now basically the same system of customary law and treaties which existed when the American
Society of International Law was founded in 1906. It is still
applied by foreign offices and , occasionally, by international
tribunals and often is used in national and local courts and
in dealings of government officials , companies , and individuals. However, the world of 1981 is not the world of 1906,
and the international law of today shows marked differences
from that of the early years of the twentieth century.
Yet the chang e is not too extreme. The subject matter of
some of the pieces in Volume I of the American Journal of
International Law (1907) w ould not be entirely out of place
today; I might mention international arbitration, the extent of
and limits on the treaty-making power of the United States ,
an d the Geneva Convention on Sick and Wounded in military action as exampl es. The first sentence, indeed , in the
first article in the first issue of the Journal , written by Elihu
Root (who was both Secretary of State and President of our
Society) , is still appropriate:
The increase of popular control over national conduct , which
ma rks the political d evelopment of our time, makes it constantly
more important that the great body of the people in each country
should h ave a just conception of their international rights and
duties.

Two pages later he add ed :
Of course it cannot be expect ed that the whole body of any people
will study in ternational law, but a sufficient number can readily
become su fficie ntl y familia r with it to lead and form popular opinion in every communi ty in our country upon all important
international questions as they arise.

In 1906 the states principally concerned with international affairs were European, of European descent, or had
European-derived cultures . International law focused on
the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 , with far
greater interest than today in the law of war and neutrality.
Th e Permanent Court of Arbitration dates from that period.
The comparati vely recent memory of the success of the Alabama Claims Arbitration after our Civil War, the Fur Seals
Arbitration, and the ten tribunals of 1903 between Venezuela
and other nations-all these contributed to the hope that
international arbitration w ould gradually become a substitute
for war in settling international disputes. One much-discussed aspect of international law then was belligerent
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interference with neutral commerce in time of war, that now
almost forgotten "prize law'' of blockade, contraband, and
the like, highlighted by the 1909 Declaration of London and
the disputes between neutrals and belligerents in the earlier
part of World War I. Except for a brief revival early in World
War II, this has become an archaic, if not obsolete, branch
of law. Until 1914, despite various wars in the decades since
1815 and particularly our own Civil War, there had been no
major world-wide war since Napoleon's time.
How different the scene became as these 75 years rolled
on! Two World Wars, the founding of the League of Nations
after the first and of the United Nations and its family of
specialized organizations after the second; the economic and
ideological split between the West and the communist (or
"Socialist") group of nations; decolonization and the great
influx of a hundred new nations onto the international scene
since World War II; the "Cold War" and the "nuclear balance
of terror"-all of these factors, and others , have changed
the world of international relations in which international
law must grow and function . The law , too , has changed and
is changing as the world changes.
Foremost of the changes has been the great growth in the
number of states among whom international law must operate. Almost a hundred new, or newly independent, nations
(particularly in Asia and Africa) have taken their places.
Most of these new states are fiercely proud of their independence and in many cases unhappy with colonial pasts; they
are frequently economically underdeveloped ; often they
derive many social, cultural, and ethical ideas and values
from sources other than that Western-European cultural heritage in which our international law grew up. Often these
new nations lack trained personnel , are inexperienced in the
conduct of international relations, and are dissatisfied to be
bound by rules in the making of which they had no part. As
actors on the international scene , and as U.N. members,
however, they are a majority in number among the states in
the international law system.
One of the characteristics of international law during this
7 5 years has been the increasing predominance of treaties.
We must think of the amazing number, variety, and complexity of the international agreements , whether bilateral,
regional , or almost world-wide, which represent purposeful
development of the law and which in many fields so largely
replace custom with more clearly defined rules chosen by
the parties to meet their needs . This process of putting international law into treaty form was already exemplified by
the codifications (chiefly of the laws of war and neutrality)
at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences , and it continues unabated. I merely mention a few : the Vienna Conventions on diplomats, consuls, and the law of treaties; the
Geneva Law of the Sea Conventions of 1958 and the ongoing
work of the Law of the Sea Conference; and the efforts in
1929 , 1949, 1977 , and since, to codify and improve aspects
of the international law of war.
Codification of customary international law progresses,
while efforts to make new law have taken the form of treaties, (bilateral and especially multilateral treaties formed
under the auspices of the League of Nations , the United
Nations, and its specialized agencies, as well as the regional
international organizations). This international law development may well be compared with the great growth of
legislation since 1800 in the internal law of many countries.
In making international law in some fields like the law of
warfare , we must guard against letting the new treaty law
become too prolix and too complex for use by line officers
and people in the field.
Our increasing use of, and dependence upon , international
agreements renders more and more acute the problem of
their binding force and the possibilities of modifying or terminating them. Pacta sunt servanda becomes increasingly
the most important rule of international law. We have <level-

oped fairly adequate methods of making international
agreements to register what it is possible for states to agree
upon. We are slowly developing arrangements in technical
fields for giving consent in advance to be bound by iateradopted rules to which formal assent need not be given
again when the rules are actually made; but we remain far
from any true legislative process in which rules are adopted
by majority vote or anything less than unanimous consent
of the parties to be bound. The most serious problems of
treaties arise today in situations where one nation wants to
e cape the obligations of a treaty into which it has entered,
or at least to stop performing the treaty, and the other party
or parties want to keep it in force and demand continuing
performance. The question arises about how far those
responsible for determining state policies will judge that the
general interest in maintaining the sanctity of treaties is
superior to the immediate gain they may see in repudiating a
burdensome treaty obligation.
Custom remains an important source of international law ,
while we still find evidences of the law in judicial decisions
and the works of writers. Though "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" are also among the
sources of international law, in practice neither international
tribunals nor foreign offices seem to rely on such general
principles as much as may have been expected when the
World Court was created in 1920. The greatest controversy
concerning "sources" of international law today centers
upon the place of resolutions, especially those of the UN
General Assembly. Although the 1945 San Francisco Conference rejected a proposal that the General Assembly "be
vesteJ with the legislative authority to enact rules of international law," in fact, we see General Assembly resolutions
frequently treated, especially if they are repeated, more or
less as if they formed rules of international law-whether on
the theory of resolutions being a kind of agreement among
those who vote for them, or instituting a kind of "instant
custom," or perhaps on the feeling among some of the newer
states that resolutions represent one way in which they can
join in "making" of international law.
The last 75 years, especially the latter half of that period ,
has seen a tremendous growth of international orgnaizations
of all types whose nineteenth-century forerunners have
expanded into the United Nations and its family of specialized agencies, as well as regional organizations like the
Organization of American States , the Organization of African
Unity and the Council of Europe. One must not forget bilateral organizations like the International Joint Commission set
up by the United States and Canada to deal with boundary
waters and related problems . These organizations, especially
the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the Organization of American States, bring us multilateral
negotiations and parliamentary diplomacy, with concern for
the "constitutional law' and the 'administrative law" of
each organization. They play a role of ever-increasing importance in the establishment of order and control in many
types of activities transcending international boundaries.
They are based upon treaties, and they frequent! give birth
to further international agreements, whether formalized in
treaties or left in the more doubtful status of resolution.
Mention of international organizations at once brings to
mind the development in the last 30 years of the European
Economic Communities. Starting with the European Coal
and Steel Community, then the "Common Market" and
Euratom, now largely merged into a single organization, we
see a new phenomenon: a limited ten-state federation in
the economic sphere, with supranational powers and functions . How extraordinarily different from Europe of 1906!
Turning to procedures and mechanisms for application of
international law to international disputes, we have seen
changes in these 75 years. The hopes of 1906 centered upon
international arbitration; the international arbitral process

has been used throughout the period, perhaps flourish ing
most at the start and then again between the two World
Wars. It had not been possible to build a true international
court at the Hague Conferences of 1899 or 1907 ; but with the
formation of the League of Nations we see the creation of
the World Court, first known as the Permanent Court of
International Justice and since 1946 as the International
Court of Justice. In its 60 years , the World Court, with its
judgments and its advisory opinions , has contributed greatly
to the development of international law; but it never has
played the part which it might play if it were used more.
Nations, great and small , have shown reluctance to bring
cases before the Court. Aside from the so-called conciliation
commissions under the Italian Peace Treaty after World
War II, there has been surprisingly little use of international
arbitration since 1946, although some important matters
have been laid before arbitral tribunals . Indeed, one of the
great contrasts to what was hoped for, back when our Society was founded in 1906, has been the lesser part played
in recent decades by third-party settlement in the application
of international law to international controversies . Instead,
we have seen far more effort at negotiating settlements of
disputes , with the law only found in the agreements reached
rather than in the opinions of international tribunals.
During these 75 years we have seen a considerable change
of attitude towards the possibility that the individual (and
the company) might be a person of international law, with
rights and duties under that law. Unlike the days surrounding the beginning of American independence, when
individuals were at least regarded as able to commit crimes
against international law, in 1906 the theory was that international law personality was limited to states , belligerents ,
and insurgents; later, possible personality of international
organizations was admitted. Only in the past four decades
have individuals been recognized as clearly having international legal rights and duties.
On the duty side , this seems to have been clearly established by the war crimes trials after World War II. On the
"rights' side, we have the whole human rights program of
the United ations and of regional groups , particularly in
estern Europe and in the American Republics. By now
it has been generally recognized that individuals have rights
under international law which do not depend solely upon
enforcement by the states of which they are nationals. I am
not saying that individuals enjoy human rights throughout

41

development not clearly embodied in the Charter. However,
the ideal remains in the Charter language. It is only when
there is agreement on what ought to be the rule that there is
much chance of the rule being made effective in action.
The United Nations has gone at least that far, which is a first
step. No one can be sure whether the lip service paid by the
Charter to this ideal will eventually be carried out in practice, but I would see it as at least a partial change from the
international law of 1906.
In all this we must recognize that law cannot coerce states
in matters of primary political importance, unless there is a
sufficiently strong feeling of international political community. Law cannot bring order when there is not enough
common will to keep the peace. Philip Jessup said:
Until the world achieves some form of international government in
which the collective will takes precedence over the individual will
of the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law, which is the
elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will not be
fulfilled .

the world; I only wish that one could truthfully say so! The
point I make is that, unlike the situation in 1906, we have by
1981 come to acknowledge that international law is concerned with the rights of individuals and not solely the
rights of states. As Professor Louis Henkin well wrote, even
back in 1965,
... the existence of the United Nations, the language of the
Charter and its dissemination among all peoples , the adoption and
invocation of the Declaration, and mountains of documents and
years of discussions have made human rights a subject of international concern, and indelibly established human rights in the
aspirations of peoples , even in the consciences of governments.

War crimes trials on the "duty" side and human rights on
the "rights" side have led the way to our acceptance of the
individual as a "person of international law," while developments in the relationships of enterprises and individuals
with foreign governments begin, at least slightly, to point in
the same direction.
A big change as compared with 1906, at least in the "lawon-paper," has been the development of international rules
against free resort to military force. In 1906, international
law left a state free to start a war for whatever reason it
chose, aside from the need to issue a formal declaration of
war. After the First World War, known as the "war to end all
wars", we saw the efforts in the League of the Nations Covenant to cut down the legality of resort to force. The 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris "outlawed" war as an instrument of national policy. Of course, that treaty did not stop
future wars, but it gave legal form to an idea which was
developing and spreading . In the United Nations Charter we
find it stated, that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." The only clear exceptions are the use
of force under United Nations auspices or in individual
or collective self-defense.
It is a tragedy that the plan of the Charter to deal with
force through the Security Council has not been carried out
in many cases, due to the veto and to the unwillingness of
U.N. members to comply with the Charter.. It is fascinating to
see how improvisation has been attempted in such crises as
Korea, Suez , Congo, Cyprus , and repeatedly in the Middle
East with the whole concept of UN "peace-keeping forces " a
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Meanwhile, of course, international law can be, and is , a
most useful instrument for giving effect to policies upon
which there is common agreement, but it cannot succeed if
it gets too far ahead of the actual feelings and attitudes of
the states concerned. With our international society what it
is, we must think of international law chiefly in terms of
agreement rather than coercion.
Now I will touch briefly on other fields of international
law. In the law of the sea, we have seen a steady increase in
shore-state control over wider and wider bands of the sea.
In contrast with three miles of territorial sea and perhaps
nine further miles of contiguous zone, which was the most
common, though by no means universally accepted, limit of
littoral state control in 1906, the on-going efforts of the current Third UN Law of the Sea Conference now seem likely to
give us 12 miles of territorial waters, a further 12 miles of
contiguous zone, a 200-mile economic zone for exclusive
fishing as well as seabed and subsoil resources, and continental shelf rights out as far as 350 miles from shore when
geological conditions fit. The pendulum is swinging further
and further towards increase in the sea areas under exclusive national control and diminution of the high seas.
State responsibility for injury to aliens , or Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (to use Borchard's famous title) ,
developed considerably in the first 30 years of our period.
Now there is skepticism in many quarters as to its usefulness or even its continuing existence as part of international
law. Particularly with respect to the duties of compensation
when foreign property is nationalized, we see increasing
doubts throughout much of the world as to whether there is ,
indeed, any relevant international law generally accepted.
Disagreement over this one point has led to disillusionment
with the entire law of state responsibility. Garcia-Amador's
imaginative attempt in the International Law Commission
to combine the rule of "no-more-than-national-treatrnent-foraliens," with the protection of human rights as a minimum
for aliens and nationals alike, appears to have been abandoned by the Commission in its more recent work. Yet as
individuals and businesses travel, live, and carry on activities abroad, the world will continue to need some
international law of state responsibility. Changes from the
older law (found largely in arbitral decisions from 1803
to 1938) are needed, but an international law of state responsibility for injury to aliens will remain necessary and useful.
In the field of immunities of foreign states , international
organizations , and the personnel of both, we see more and
more use of treaties to clarify the exact extent of immunities.
So far as states are concerned, the world-wide trend (except,
apparently, for the Communist countries) is toward the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunities , that is, confining
immunities to strictly sovereign acts, which in 1906 was

chiefly limited to Belgium and Italy. Many would agree that
national courts may, on the whole, do a better job of dealing
with disputes which arise out of "commercial" operations
by foreign states, than diplomatic settlement can.
In the law of nationality, we have seen increasing recognition that women, including married women, should have
their own nationality rights, even at the expense of unity of
the family. Even more impressive has been the effort to get
international agreement to deal with stateless persons, primarily refugees , at least since the end of World War I.
Iucreasingly modern states domestically, and the international community, have found it necessary to develop rules
and institutions of the law to deal with problems which
formerly escaped any need for legal and governmental regulation. Among others, Professor Wolfgang Friedmann
pointed in 1964 to the "developing cooperative law of
nations," binding nations "not in the traditional rules of
abstention and respect, but in positive principles of cooperation for common interests."
In many areas new international law has been developed
to deal with new problems caused by expanding technology.
I mention the growth of international aviation law, the
development of space law, much of the international law of
telecommunications, and the slow growth of international
law dealing with transnational pollution, especially of the
sea. All this has been chiefly by treaty. One might also speak
of the international law of trade, commerce, and finance,
particularly of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, commodity agreements, and all that goes into the "international
law of trade and development." Only a little of that was with
us in 1906; many of us are not proficient in the details, but
we should all recognize its importance. Even 50 years ago
my old professor, Edwin De Witt Dickinson used to remark
that international law was no longer in the "BlackstoneChancellor Kent era" but had even then become "a whole
curriculum." With this emphasis on specialized areas of
international law we also see its broadening in scope and
the obliteration of boundaries separating it from other areas
of the law, exemplified in the use of terms like "transnational law," or "international legal studies," or "world law."
On the educational and scholarly side, the period under
review has seen, at least in the United States, a sizeable
increase in number of those studying international law in its
various aspects in the law schools, with some falling off in

the proportion of college undergraduates taking political
science courses in international law as other international
studies have attracted more faculty and students. Many new
international legal journals have been born in this country,
particularly in the last few years; there has been some
increase in such journals abroad as well. Collections of documents, and of international law decisions of national and
international courts, have become available (I mention only
the Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases , now the
International Law Reports). Moore's eight-volume Digest of
International Law , as found particularly in the practice of the
United States, was published in 1906, to be followed by the
Hackworth Digest, and more recently the magnificent 15
volumes of the Whiteman Digest. and the digest volumes
issued by the State Department for 1973-1977.
We are happy to see similar compilations of the international practice of other nations. These new journals , new
compilations of practice , and the tremendous growth in the
monographic literature in various languages make it more
and more difficult for any individual scholar to keep abreast
of what is happening in international law but give us far
more information about it than was available 75 years ago.
I have spoken too long on a field I've enjoyed working in
for 54 years. In closing, let me join in the cautious optimism
Professor J. L. Brierly showed in his outstanding little introduction to international law, first published 53 years ago:
... the law of nations is neither a myth on the one hand, nor a
panacea on the other, but just one institution among others which
we can use for the building of saner international order.
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